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Both Indonesia and Vietnam, as members of ASEAN, have negotiated a free trade agreement 
with  China  (ACFTA).  ASEAN  Member  States  can  independently  negotiate  their  tariff 
reductions. Both countries are generally aware of the opportunities access to the large Chinese 
market may present, but both are concerned to differing degrees about being flooded with 
Chinese imports, including agricultural products. As the time for implementation approaches, 
Indonesia  has  expressed  a  desire  to  renegotiate  its  tariff  reduction  schedules  to  protect 
sensitive sectors, including agriculture. By contrast, Vietnam, just over the border from China 
and with a history of informal trade, seems more accepting of the prospects.  
A global general equilibrium model, GTAP, is used to compare the potential impacts of the 
ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement on the Indonesian and Vietnamese agricultural sectors. 
Tariff line data are aggregated to eight primary and four processed agricultural sectors. This 
enables the differential impact of separate sensitive sectors for Indonesia and Vietnam to be 
identified. The simulated results following full implementation indicate both countries would 
improve their trade and welfare if the agreement is implemented as negotiated and tariff cuts 
are  effective,  although  the  extent  of  exemptions  for  sensitive  products  represent  differing 
degrees of missed opportunities for each country. At the sectoral level, both countries can 
expect some reductions, compared with the baseline, in output of some agricultural sectors, 
but  generally  these  changes  are  relatively  small  unless  significant  non-tariff  barriers  are 
addressed. From an economic perspective, structural adjustment should not be constrained in 
such circumstances. 
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1. Introduction  
Both Indonesia and Vietnam, as members of ASEAN, have negotiated a free trade agreement 
with China (ASEAN China Free Trade Agreement - ACFTA) in which ASEAN Member 
States can independently negotiate their tariff reductions. The two countries are aware of the 
opportunities  access  to  the  large  Chinese  market  presents,  being  significant  traders  with 
China, but they are concerned to differing degrees about being flooded with Chinese imports, 
including agricultural products. As the time for implementation approaches, Indonesia has 
expressed a desire to renegotiate its tariff reduction schedules to protect sensitive sectors, 
including agriculture (Patunru et al. 2010). By contrast, Vietnam, just over the border from 
China and with a long history of informal trade and a more recent history of the benefits of 
trade liberalisation, seems more accepting of the prospects. Why is this so? Is Vietnam more 
accepting of Chinese competition because of its location or other factors such as the benefits 
of trade liberalisation, including allowing the imports of products from the world‘s cheapest 
suppliers? Has Indonesia negotiated a worse deal with China under the ACFTA than Vietnam 
and wanting to redress this, or has a changed political economy made them less committed to 
trade liberalisation?  
The purpose of this paper is to analyse such questions through comparing past trade flows, 
tariffs, other trade-related aspects and the agricultural political economy, as well as potential 
impacts of the ACFTA on the Indonesian and Vietnamese agricultural sectors using a global 
general  equilibrium  model,  GTAP.  Aggregated  tariff  line  data  with  some  modification 
enables the differential impact of separate sensitive sectors for Indonesia and Vietnam to be 
identified and analysed.  
The simulated results following full implementation indicate both countries would improve 
their  trade  and  welfare  if  the  agreement  is  implemented  as  negotiated  and  tariff  cuts  are 
effective, although the extent of exemptions for sensitive products represent differing degrees 
of missed opportunities for each  country. At the sectoral level, both countries can expect 
some  reductions,  compared  with  the  baseline,  in  output  of  some  agricultural  sectors. 
However, generally these changes are relatively small apart from when significant non-tariff 
barriers are addressed. From an economic perspective, structural adjustment should not be 
constrained in such circumstances. 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section presents trade flows, tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers, plus aspects of ACFTA such as exemptions of sensitive sectors. The third section 
describes the GTAP CGE model, the data, sectors and regions, and scenarios that analyse 
FTAs. The fourth section presents the results, setting out trade, welfare and sector impacts,  
and conclusions, limitations and implications are drawn in the final section.   
2. Existing trade flows, tariffs and institutional arrangements 
(i) Trade flows 
Both Indonesia and Vietnam are significant traders with China. In 2009, Indonesia had China 
as its third largest destination of exports and second largest source of imports whilst Vietnam 
had China as its fourth largest destination of exports and largest source of imports. Indonesia 
and Vietnam gain more from Chinese imports than the other way around. 
 
Indonesian and Vietnamese trades in food show some similarities as well as differences (see 
table of trade flows and shares below). Food export values have been growing at about the 
same rate until 2009 when those for both countries fell despite high prices, again by about the 
same rate. This could be the result of the Global Financial Crisis lowering overall trade and 
countries increasing their self-sufficiency in 2009 following the shortages and price hikes in 
2008. China‘s food export values followed the same pattern but at lower rates, the 2009 fall 
only being around 1-2 per cent. Food import values have also been increasing, Vietnam‘s 
more so than Indonesia‘s which actually fell in 2009. China followed Indonesia‘s pattern but 
at  a  higher  level  and  rate.  Net  food  trade  followed  the  pattern  of  food  export  values, 
increasing up to 2008 and falling in 2009. China‘s fell earlier and actually became negative in 
2008 and less so in 2009.  
 
A notable difference which offers one explanation of the counter movements in import values 
in 2009 of Indonesia and Vietnam is in the share of food trade in total trade. Indonesia‘s food 
export and import shares increased, exports quite substantially to nearly double in 2009 of 
what they were in 2000 (see the following table containing the shares). In contrast, Vietnam‘s 
export share fell significantly by about a third whilst its import share more than doubled from 
a low base. Vietnam has obviously diversified its exports away from agriculture/food, as is 
normally the case with development, whilst Indonesian exports have concentrated relatively 
into  agriculture/food.  Vietnam‘s  pattern  reflects  that  of  China‘s  development  path  where 
exports declined more and imports rose less, both from lower share values. 
 
This relative diversification of Vietnam away, and the  relative concentration of Indonesia 
towards agricultural/food production and trade is also evident from looking at the relative 
GDP per agricultural worker in both countries. In Indonesia, post the Asian financial crisis, 
GDP per agricultural worker halved, contrary to the usual pattern in growing economies, and 
this  was in conjunction  with  no shortage of government policies and increases in related 
government expenditures. In Vietnam, labour has been successfully pulled out of agriculture, 
facilitated  by  the  introduction  of  labour-saving  techniques  of  production.  As  a  result, 
agricultural GDP per capita grew due to the decrease in workers as well as an increase in  
value-added. In Indonesia, agriculture‘s employment share exceeds its GDP share, which is 
indicative of the ―labour shift‖ factor of a much lower productivity per agricultural worker 
relative to other workers, but this relativity is common to other developing countries such as 
Vietnam to varying degrees. 
 
Table 1 Indonesian and Vietnamese food trade flows (2000 to 2009) and shares of all 
trade 
  1990  2000  2007  2008  2009  Share 2000  Share 2009 
Indonesia               
- food exports  4154  7764  23805  32857  25264  11.9  21.1 
- food imports  1104  3336    7857    9383    8639    7.7    9.4 
- net food trade  3050  4428  15948  23474  16625     
Vietnam               
- food exports  -  3954  11331  14560  10704  27.3  18.7 
- food imports  -    814    3929    5444    7458    5.2  10.7 
- net food trade  -  3140    7402    9116    3246     
Source: WTO International Trade Statistics 2010 
 
There are other notable differences in trade between Indonesia and Vietnam, more evident 
when adjustments to total trade are made for the different sizes of the countries in terms of 
populations and GDP. In terms of trade per capita, Vietnam‘s is around 40 per cent higher 
than Indonesia‘s, US$1,581 over 2007-09 compared to US$1,148. China‘s is US$1,921. 
 
The same relationship holds with the trade to the GDP ratio which is a measure of a country‘s 
openness  to  trade.  The  ratios  were  161.3  per  cent  for  Vietnam  versus  52.8  per  cent  for 
Indonesia  over  2007-09,  illustrating  Vietnam‘s  openness  to  trade  is  much  greater  than 
Indonesia‘s. China‘s was in between the two at 58.6 per cent. 
 
More  generally,  the  two  countries  macro  economic  situations  differ  with  indicators  like 
Indonesia‘s GDP/capita growth, as well as its degree and growth of trade openness lagging 
that of Vietnam and China. Vietnam have undertaken many reforms in the macro-economic 
area  in  its  transition  towards  a  market  economy,  for  example  closing  or  selling  off 
unprofitable  State  Owned  Enterprises  (SOEs),  removing  production  and  consumption 
subsidies from the state budget, as well as interest rate subsidies to SOEs (though some still 
appear to have preferential access to credit). The exchange rate was stabilised and devalued, 
raising  incentives  for  exports  which  were  encouraged  by  progressively  lifting  barriers  to 
trade, including inputs for agricultural production (there are now few restrictions on exports,  
tariffs are down to around 11-12 per cent, and Quantitative Restrictions are on only 1.2 per 
cent of imports) (OECD 2010). In contrast, Indonesia still has a logistic agency in Bulog that 
controls trade, storage, distribution etc, in some key commodities like rice, as well as funds 
production and consumption subsidies (including on interest rates through credit inputs) from 
the state budget.  
 
(ii) Tariffs, non-tariff barriers and other trade-related policies 
As  tariffs  are  being  looked  at  by  Indonesia  for  renegotiating  its  commitments  under  the 
ACFTA, it is useful to look at what has happened in the past with tariff reductions and trade 
in general, and more specifically in relation to China and agriculture. 
 
As mentioned in the last part, Vietnam‘s final bound and applied simple average tariffs in 
2009 were both around 11 per cent and tariff binding coverage was 100 per cent, as might be 
expected for a country that had recently undergone WTO accession (in 2007) (see table 2 for 
details on such selected tariffs). For agricultural goods, both these tariffs were respectively 
around 19 per cent. Indonesia‘s final bound tariffs in 2009 were 37 per cent and applied tariffs 
were much lower around 7 per cent, and tariff binding coverage around 96 per cent. For 
agricultural goods they were respectively 47 and 8 per cent. Vietnam‘s bilateral applied tariffs 
on China‘s exports are 42 per cent and Indonesia‘s are 6 per cent. Indonesian applied tariffs 
are lower and bound tariffs higher than those for Vietnam. China‘s tariff structure is more 
similar to Vietnam‘s than Indonesia‘s. 
 
Table 2 Bound and applied simple average tariffs 
  China  Indonesia  Vietnam 
  %  %  % 
Bound tariff   10.0  37.1    11.4 
Bound tariff agriculture   15.7  47.1    18.5 
Applied tariff   9.6    6.8    10.9 
Applied tariff agriculture   15.6    8.4    18.9 
Tariff binding coverage   100  95.8  100 
Applied tariffs on imports from China    -    6    42 
Source: WTO Country Profiles and GTAP v7 database. 
 
If tariffs were reflecting the true relative levels of protection of Indonesia and Vietnam than 
this could be an explanation of why Indonesia was more concerned about trade with China 
than Vietnam, regardless of the implementation of the ACFTA – it appears much more open 
to  increased  imports  of  Chinese  products.  But  the  relative  tariffs  go  against  the  fact  that  
Vietnam has had greater openness to trade than Indonesia as measured by the ratio of its trade 
to GDP. Moreover, the relative bound positions taken by the two countries suggests Indonesia 
is much more cautious in its trade liberalisation than Vietnam. The impression is that Vietnam 
has reformed more in the recent past (but from a very long way back) and that this has been 
responsible for the large growth in trade. One possible explanation of this conundrum is that 
tariffs are only part of the trade constraints or barriers story. 
 
Countries may  have low  tariffs but be  constraining  trade more than  countries  with much 
larger tariffs through the use of a maze of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) such as use of monopoly 
traders, licensing, anti-dumping actions, restrictive SPS settings etc. As can been seen from 
the following table of WTO notifications, measures in force and dispute numbers, Indonesia 
is much more active in anti-dumping, safeguards and disputes which are often areas where 
NTBs are prevalent. China has a lot of anti-dumping actions but it is the defendant in requests 
for consultation nearly three times as often than it is the complainant.  
 
Table 3 Number of WTO notifications and measures in force, and number of disputes 
  Indonesia  Vietnam  China 
Anti-dumping  15    -  106 
Safeguards    3    0  0 
Request for consultation (complainant-
defendant)  5-4  1-0 
 
7-20 
Original panel/Appellate body reports (―)  2-4  0-0  1-5 
Compliance panel/Appellate body reports (―)  1-0  0-0 
 
0-0 
Arbitration awards (―)  0-0  0-0  0-0 
Source: WTO Country Profiles. 
 
There are more quantitative measures that incorporate tariffs and some non-tariff barriers, 
such as Nominal Rates of Assistance to producers (NRAs) which have been measured via 
comparisons of domestic and border prices across a range of agricultural commodities for 
many countries, including Indonesia and Vietnam, in a major World Bank project (Anderson 




Table 4 NRAs to all Agricultural Products, Indonesia, Vietnam and China, 1996 to 2005  
  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Indonesia  -10  -7  -24    6  16  17  15  18  12  - 
Vietnam    -3  -5    -8  21  15  24  11  32  23  11 
China  4  7  10  5  8  4  4  7  7  7 
Note:  Indonesian  figures  at  farm  level,  covered  agricultural  products  and  including  the  fertiliser 
subsidy. 
Source: World Bank Agricultural Distortions Research Project 
 
The final available year of NRAs are around the same order for both countries, in contrast to 
the  situation with  the  tariffs, as a result of taking  account of non-tariff barriers. Vietnam 
NRAs do not take into account intermediate goods produced by SOEs with high tariffs which 
would  lower  these  NRAs.  Given  that  Vietnam  tariffs  were  double  those  of  Indonesia,  if 
Vietnam had no NTBs then Indonesian NTBs would have to be of the same order as its tariffs 
for the NRAs to be of the same order for both countries. China‘s NRAs have been positive 
but low relative to Indonesia and Vietnam.  
 
However,  not  all  non-tariff  barriers  will  necessarily  be  taken  into  account  in  these  NRA 
measures. For example, using the restricted issuing of licensing to constrain imports as in the 
case of Indonesian beef would most likely not be picked up as a consistent NTB. Monopoly 
importers often have similar non-transparent behaviour. SPS and TBT issues are a grey area 
where it is difficult to differentiate between genuine health-related constraints etc and those 
that are basically aimed at protection (for example, see Bosworth and Cutbush (2010) on 
Australian SPS arrangements in relation to New Zealand apples). Anti-dumping is sometimes 
treated  the  same  despite  it  having  little  economic  justification  in  terms  of  the  predatory 
pricing argument which is rarely if ever proven in practice. To identify all non-tariff barriers 
requires detailed analysis of the countries policies and their implementation. An upper bound 
approach  to  assessing  non-tariff  barriers  is  to  use  the  difference  between  domestic  and 
international prices, assuming none of the  difference is due to aspects like differences in 
quality, that is all of the difference is due to non-tariff barriers.   
 
Indonesia‘s  agricultural  policies  are  focused  on  self-sufficiency  and  price  stability,  and 
mainly  in  respect  of  rice  where  Bulog  acts  as  a  monopoly  trader  (thus  making  tariffs 
irrelevant), undertaking domestic market purchases, stockholding, sales, operating under floor 
and ceiling prices, or high tariffs or import bans have been imposed, both of which have led to 
large nominal protection or assistance rates. Input subsidies feature prominently (though some 
on  fertiliser  have  been  removed  but  then  reimposed),  generally  requiring  complementary 
interventionist trade or border policy (e.g. the above mentioned rice price support, and sugar  
tariffs (along with forced plantings, regulated distribution chain  and import licenses)) and 
constraints on major exports such as tree crops (export bans and taxes, coffee export quotas, 
and bio-fuel mixing regulations).  
 
One aspect evident from the NRAs table is that these have jumped around quite a lot, turning 
from negative to positive in recent years and varying year-on-year within such groupings. 
Changes in international prices offer some explanation even when Indonesian policies do not 
change and this needs to be taken into account when trying to estimate representative costs of 
policies.  But  domestic  factors  are  also  at  work.  Fane  and  Warr  (2007)  offer  a  political 
economy explanation of this changing protection. In general, they observed that Indonesia has 
followed a pattern of ―good economic times, bad policies  and bad economic times, good 
policies‖ where good/bad policies refers to their ―good‖ economic efficiency or their ―bad‖ 
protection.  During  bad  economic  times,  technocrats  introducing  economically  efficient 
policies supported by institutions like the World Bank that needed to be on-side to encourage 
loans etc, held sway with the President. In good economic times, nationalists with popular 
support held sway with protectionist policies to support nationalist industries that were very 
expensive and only fundable during good economic times. This situation changed after 1998 
when NRAs started another positive stint following the Asian financial crisis with the move 
to a much more democratic and populist form of government that has reduced the influence of 
technocrats and promoted populist economic nationalism.  
 
Vietnam  has  become  a  major  exporter  of  rice,  coffee,  etc  with  its  reforms.  Unilateral 
liberalisation under Doi Moi, which abandoned central planning for effective property rights 
over land and making production decisions based on market signals, increased production 
incentives,  production  and  in  some  cases  exports.  Vietnam  subsequently  entered  into 
multilateral,  regional  and  bilateral  trade  agreements  following  these  unilateral  reforms. 
Vietnam‘s recent levels of NRAs are dominated by one importable commodity, sugar with 
high tariff protection etc.  
 
There is a political economy element behind Vietnam‘s changing NRAs as well. There is not 
a ―more democratic government‖ story here but one concerning a single commodity in sugar 
which has its own political economy of a strict licensing regime for governing sugar imports 
and  being  the  focus  of  government  rural  development  and  agricultural  diversification 
programs that  was strong enough to  have  survived the opportunity for reform during  the 
WTO accession (Athukorala et al. 2007). Vietnam does  not have like  Indonesia,  a  wider 
number  of  commodities  that  it  assists  or  protects  through  input  subsidies  and  border 
protection through tariffs and NTBs, as well as export sectors that it taxes  – sugar, rice, dairy,  
livestock,  etc  in  the  first  instance  and  tree  crops  like  palm  oil,  cocoa  etc  in  the  second 
instance. Vietnam has diversified away from agriculture in terms of contribution to GDP, 
employment, state-owned enterprises, budget dependence and exports in what has become a 
very  open  economy  with  few  export  constraints,  highly  dependent  on  trade.  Agriculture, 
though still contributing significantly to the Vietnamese economy, is becoming less important 
politically than other sectors. 
 
There are other agricultural trade-related policies that would not be picked up in measures 
such NRAs that can have a positive effect on agricultural, for example agricultural-related 
R&D. There is evidence in Indonesia of a slowdown in agricultural production and potential 
trade  as  a  consequence  of  a  long-run  downward  trend  in  related  public  investment  –  the 
growth rate in spending on agricultural research is negative. In contrast in Vietnam there has 
been a rapid growth in government investment in R&D which is felt has contributed to the 
growth in food production and trade, for example in aquaculture. 
 
(iii) The ACFTA agreement – exemptions under sensitive, highly sensitive etc 
The ASEAN-China FTA was signed in 2002 and renegotiated in 2006 when the more recent 
ASEAN members, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, specified their exemptions for 
sensitive and highly sensitive products. Implementation was to commence in 2010. As far as 
trade in goods is concerned, tariff reductions phased in over a number of years. Tariffs on 
products in the sensitive list were to be reduced to 20 per cent by 2012 and to between 0 and 
five per cent within the implementation period, and highly sensitive track products were to be 
reduced  to  a  maximum  of  50  per  cent.  Each  ASEAN  member  has  a  different  list  of 
exemptions. Countries tend to exempt products with high tariffs although not exclusively (see 
Scollay and Trewin (2006) for analysis of this issue in ASEAN which showed member states 
exempt products that they did not need to protect for survival as well as products that were 
always going to require protection to survive). Indonesia has 47 exemptions, most notably in 
chapters 10 (rice), 17 (sugar), 22 (alcohol), 64 (footwear) and 87 (motor vehicles) (ASEAN 
Secretariat 2006). Indonesia is currently renegotiating its highly sensitive list. This involves 
removing  some  items  and  replacing  them  with  others.  It  must  get  agreement  with  China 
before the list can be revised. 
 
Less developed Vietnam was allowed 150 items in  its  highly sensitive list, plus  a longer 
implementation period. The main chapters include 17 (sugar), 24  (tobacco), 40 (rubber), 69 
(ceramics),  70  (glass),  72  (steel),  84  (motor  bikes),  85  (audio  devices)  and  87  (motor 
vehicles). 
  
China with its much broader and larger economy has 101 items in its highly sensitive list. The 
main items are chapters 10 (rice), 11 (maize), 15 (oils), 17 (sugar), 24 (tobacco), 40 (rubber), 
44 (wood products), 48 (paper products), 52 (cotton) and 87 (motor vehicles).  
 
These exemptions are specified at the six digit level from a possible list of 5113 tariffs (so for 
example Vietnam‘s sensitive list is about 3 per cent in number of tariff lines but is generally 
much  larger in terms of the domestic production they are  attempting to protect. Bilateral 
tariffs reductions are calculated at the six digit level, using the Gempack utility TASTE, and 
aggregated to the 23 user specified GTAP sectors shown in table 5. The bilateral tariffs before 
and after the simulations are shown in this table. From an Indonesian perspective, the most 
significant changes are for ‗Beverages and tobacco‘ and ‗Textiles & apparel‘. Notably, there 
are  no  changes  to  rice  and  sugar,  both  of  which  have  relatively  high  tariffs.  From  the 
perspective  of  Indonesia‘s  exports  to  China,  most  tariffs  are  reduced  to  zero  with  the 
exception of ‗Beverages and tobacco‘ which are relatively low initially. From a Vietnamese 
perspective,  the  most  significant  changes  are  for  agricultural  products  of  ‗Rice‘  and 
‗Vegetables etc‘ as well as ‗Textiles and apparel‘. There are relatively small changes to highly 
protected  ‗Sugar‘  and  ‗Other  crops‘,  as  well  as  ‗Beverages  and  Tobacco‘.  From  the 
perspective of Vietnam‘s exports to China, most tariffs are reduced to near zero with the 
exception of ‗Rice‘ which maintains a very high tariff and ‗Other cereal‘, reflecting China‘s 
strong  grain  self-sufficiency  policy  and  its  protection  against  competitive  suppliers  like 
Vietnam.   
 
Table 5a Base and final Indonesian and Chinese bilateral tariffs 
 
Indonesian  tariffs  on 
imports from China 
  China  tariffs  on  imports 
from Indonesian 
           
Sector  Base  Final    Base  Final 
  %  %    %  % 
Rice  20.0  20.0    0  0 
Other cereals  1.2  0    0  0 
Oilseeds  4.9  0    5.2  0 
Vegetable oils and fats  0.7  0    2.6  0 
Sugar  35.1  35.0    7.0  0 
Vegetables, fruit and nuts  5.0  0    7.4  0 
Other crops  4.7  0    7.2  0 
Livestock  4.7  0.1    2.9  0 
Forestry  5.1  0    5.8  0 
Fishing  4.9  0    2.8  0 
Petroleum and coal 
products  2.3  0 
 
0.8  0 
Ruminant meat  5.2  0.1    6.2  0 
Non-ruminant meat  4.9  0    3.8  0 
Other processed agriculture  5.8  0    6.8  0  
Beverages and tobacco  28.3  2.3    11.6  0 
Textiles & apparel  10.2  0.3    7.1  0 
Chemicals  5.6  0.1    8.3  2.9 
Metal manufactures  6.6  0.1    3.8  0 
Wood & paper products  5.8  0.6    3.1  0.2 
Manufactures  6.3  1.0    6.1  0 
Source: GTAP version 7 database and author‘s calculations. 
 
Table 5b Base and final Vietnamese and Chinese bilateral tariffs 
 
Vietnamese  tariffs  on 
imports from China 
  China  tariffs  on  imports 
from Vietnam 
           
Sector  Base  Final    Base  Final 
  %  %    %  % 
Rice  20.34  0    62.36  45.84 
Other cereals  3.12  0    16.21  11.92 
Oilseeds  5.19  -0.01    7.97  0 
Vegetable oils and fats  2.1  0.01    21.18  1.84 
Sugar  20.59  16.36    6.87  1.58 
Vegetables, fruit and nuts  15.07  0    13.5  0 
Other crops  13.91  10.55    9.05  0 
Livestock  5.79  0.05    4.22  0 
Forestry  4.17  0    6.23  0 
Fishing  10.68  0.02    4.12  0 
Petroleum and coal 
products  17.88  0.03 
 
0.36  0 
Ruminant meat  10  0.01    10.74  0 
Non-ruminant meat  15.09  0.13    1.57  -0.01 
Other processed agriculture  19.35  0.23    7.55  0.02 
Beverages and tobacco  78.43  69.71    4.25  0 
Textiles & apparel  12.8  0.21    9.96  0 
Chemicals  2.36  0.2    12.17  7.33 
Metal manufactures  6.51  2.81    5.72  0 
Wood & paper products  15.28  2.17    1.61  0.91 
Manufactures  14.15  8.25    6.2  0 
Source: GTAP version 7 database and author‘s calculations. 
 
(iv) Some other relevant aspects of FTAs 
It  is  unusual  for  FTAs  like  ACFTA  to  address  non-tariff  barriers  (NTBs)  though  under 
ANZCERTA, anti-dumping is handled as part of competition policy. Generally, current WTO 
arrangements  such  as  in  relation  to  anti-dumping  and  SPS  are  accepted  under  the  trade 
agreements.  
 
Other agricultural trade-related policies such as R&D support are generally not part of FTAs 
though  under  the  AANZFTA  there  has  been  some  R&D  funding  through  the  ASEAN 
Secretariat to assist ASEAN Member States in the trade agreement, for example assisting in a  
diagnostic study of constraints in trade in services and prioritising capacity building that will 
assist trade liberalisation.  
 
FTAs are more about the political economy than trade liberalisation – ―many tend to be ―trade 
light‖  tools  of  foreign  policy  and  diplomacy‖  (Sally  2008).  Shifts  in  trade  policy  cause 
redistribution of gains and losses between sectors, regions, socio-economic groups etc. Given 
these  aspects  it  not  surprising  that  Indonesia  and  Vietnam  with  their  different  political 
economies display different attitudes to the ACFTA. With strong political economy drivers, 
politically sensitive sectors and associated protection policies like anti-dumping, SPS, TBT 
etc are carved out of FTAs.  
 
3. The model 
The Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model is used to measure the impact of changes 
in trade policy on the traded goods sector. GTAP is ideal for modelling preferential trade 
agreements because it contains bilateral trade and tariff data.  It can also handle non-tariff 
measures if these can be converted into ad valorem equivalents. However, it has difficulty 
incorporating  Rules  of  Origin  in  its  analysis.  It  is  a  multi-country  and  multi-sectoral 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model and fully documented in Hertel and Tsigas 
(1997). For each country or region, there are multistage production processes which combine 
primary  factors  of  land,  labour,  capital  and  natural  resources  with  intermediate  inputs 
assuming a constant elasticity of substitution technology. Returns to factors, i.e. income, are 
taxed by the government, saved or spent by the single representative household. While there 
is no substitution between intermediate inputs and primary factors or among the intermediate 
inputs,  there  is  substitution  between  different  sources  of  intermediate  inputs,  namely 
domestic  and  imports  from  each  region.  The  regions  are  linked  together  by  imports  and 
exports of commodities. Similar commodities, which are produced by different countries, are 
assumed to be imperfect substitutes for one another. The degree of substitution is determined 
by the Armington elasticities 
 
In this application, the standard closure is modified to allow capital to flow between countries 
in response to changes in demand for capital intensive goods. In addition, a semi-flexible 
labour market for unskilled labour is assumed, implying a change in the demand for labour 
leads  to  some  increase  in  both  wages  and  employment.  Skilled  labour  is  assumed  to  be 
mobile in each country but in a fixed supply, with no surplus labour. This is the standard 
GTAP closure.  
  
GTAP is used here to compare the trade and welfare effects of changes in bilateral tariffs 
once the impacts have worked through. There is no attempt to phase in the tariff changes nor 
trace the time profile of the impacts. Thus, we ignore changes such as growth in trade that 
may  have  occurred  over  the  implementation  period,  but  we  incorporate  differential 
changes in productivity suggested to be the result of differential expenditures on R&D 
as separate shocks to capture the effect of such changes over the implementation 
period. The focus here is on changes in tariffs as outlined in the schedules. We also attempt 
to capture the impact of non-tariff barriers such as mentioned earlier and other quantitative 
restrictions such as import bans or quarantine restrictions that result in differences between 
domestic and border prices in some separate scenarios. 
 
The regions used in the model are European Union, United States, Japan, Australia, Other 
developed,  China,  Indonesia,  Malaysia,  Philippines,  Thailand,  Vietnam,  Rest  of  ASEAN, 
South Asia, Central America, Africa and Rest of World. The sectoral aggregation is shown in 
table 8. This is similar to table 5 with the addition of services. 
 
Four scenarios are modelled here: 
(i)   FTA as negotiated; This involves removing all the tariffs between China and Vietnam 
and  Indonesia  as  of  2007  (when  AFTA  was  in  place  but  not  recent  FTAs  such  as  the 
AANZFTA) with the exception of those in the highly sensitive list. These are reduced to a 
maximum of 50 per cent.  
(ii) FTA without exemptions. 
(iii) Productivity. Scenario 1 plus annual productivity increases of 3.7% for China, 2.9% for 
Vietnam and 1.5% for Indonesia
2.  
(iv) NTB. Scenario 1 with nominal rates of assistance  (NRAs)  used to determine tariff  
equivalents for Indonesian rice and sugar. In the absence of sound data, we use baseline rates 




The estimated annual changes in welfare under the scenarios are shown in table 6. The first 
point to note is the changes are positive, suggesting each country benefits from the tariff 
                                                 
2 These were annual estimates for agriculture obtained from Fuglie (2008) applied over the whole 
period of simulation and to all sectors which will isolate the individual country impacts but which will 
be refined in later simulations. 
3 These are of the order estimated in some earlier research (e.g. Warr 2005) but again are mainly used 
here to illustrate the relative impacts of NTBs and will be refined if better measures can be obtained for 
a range of products in later simulations.   
reductions. These need not always be the case. FTA agreements can make members worse 
off, along with non-members, and this is a common criticism of such agreements.  
 
China gains the most, by virtue of having the largest economy. Compared with the size of its 
economy, Vietnam benefits most.  
 
In welfare terms at least, all countries would have done better by removing tariffs on their 
highly sensitive products.  These gains are significant for China but not so significant for 
Indonesia and Vietnam. This  can be  seen by comparing the two scenarios in table 6. As 
negotiated,  China  captures  about  50  per  cent  of  possible  gains,  whereas  Indonesia  and 
Vietnam capture around 90 and 80 per cent respectively. However, part of these gains come 
from improved terms of trade  rather than allocative efficiency gains from better resource 
allocation.  
 
The third scenario shows the benefits of productivity growth. In fact these benefits swamp the 
allocative efficiency gains from trade liberalisation, although the technical change enhances 
the allocative efficiency effects and the value of additional endowments, labour and capital. 
However, there are negative terms of trade effects.  
  
Removing non-tariff barriers assumed to be equivalent of 200 and 400 per cent for Indonesian 
rice and sugar increases Indonesian annual welfare gains from $1758m to $1887m. Domestic 
production of rice and sugar is estimated to fall 1 and 19 per cent respectively, and imports 
increase  by  90  and  200  per  cent.  The  changes  in  imports  are  small  relative  to  domestic 
production. The self-sufficiency ratio for rice falls marginally from 99 to 98 per cent, whereas 
for sugar it falls more significantly from 76 to 70 per cent. 
 





exemptions  Productivity  NTB 
  $m  $m  $m  $m 
China  6478  12704  436016  6385 
Indonesia  1758  1961  22778  1887 
Vietnam  579  742  5709  580 
Source. GTAP simulation. 
 
The source of the welfare changes is shown in table 7. The bulk of the welfare gains stem 
mainly  from  using  resources  better  (allocative  efficiency),  using  resources  that  were 
previously under-utilised (endowments) and more favourable prices for imports or exports  
(terms of trade). For Indonesia, the second scenario delivers almost no additional allocative 
efficiency gains (tariffs cannot be lowered much further), but there are improvements in its 
terms  of  trade  and  an  increased  demand  for  unskilled  labour-intensive  products.  Vietnam 
makes  some  allocative  efficiency  gains  (probably  mainly  from  its  resources,  textiles  and 
manufacturing  sectors)  but  its  terms  of  trade  decline  further.  China  gains  from  all  three 
sources. This is mainly related to trade with Vietnam, matching up with Vietnam gaining 
more, compared to the size of its economy, than Indonesia from the tariff reductions. This 
story changes a little once NTBs are brought into the analysis. 
 









change  Total 
  $m  $m  $m  $m  $m 
FTA as negotiated           
China  994  4320  1320  0  6478 
Indonesia  316  1373  71  0  1758 
Vietnam  360  458  -235  0  579 
           
FTA without exemptions         
China  1935  7761  3417  0  12704 
Indonesia  322  1524  105  0  1961 
Vietnam  436  633  -293  0  742 
           
Productivity           
China  55703  171819  -17282  221482  436017 
Indonesia  2517  11896  -450  8606  22778 
Vietnam  1443  1667  -525  3278  5709 
           
NTB           
China  953  4282  1306  0  6385 
Indonesia  417  1431  37  0  1887 
Vietnam  361  458  -234  0  580 
Source. GTAP simulation. 
 
To show the importance of exemptions, the change in exports and imports by sector and for 
each economy in total is shown in tables 8 and 9 for the first two scenarios. China‘s increase 
of 1.5 per cent is half of what could be achieved without exemptions, whereas Indonesia has 
little scope to improve, although using NTBs against Indonesian rice and sugar imports has a 
significant effect at a sectoral level. Vietnam‘s exports of 5.5 per cent is somewhat short of its 
potential, 7.4 per cent. For Indonesia the largest relative changes are in the non-agricultural 
sectors of forestry (10 per cent) and manufacturing (6 per cent). Vietnam shows significant  
growth in a number of areas, most notably vegetable oils and fats, forestry, vegetables and 
fruit, non-ruminant meat, textiles and apparel, and manufactured goods. For China, rice and 
sugar and beverages and tobacco could increase markedly if Indonesia opened up its markets 
completely. 
 
Table 8 Change in exports  
  FTA as negotiated    FTA without exemptions 









  %  %  %    %  %  % 
Paddy rice & proc rice  21.4  -3.4  2.5    35.9  4.6  11.8 
Other cereals  2.5  -2.1  -0.7    1.2  -2.5  2.5 
Oilseeds  1.4  -1.8  -4.1    0.3  -1.5  -6.1 
Vegetable oils and fats  3.0  0.8  58.1    3.0  0.7  69.8 
Sugar  -0.8  0.0  1.3    78.2  0.4  2.8 
Vegetables and fruit  4.5  -0.7  6.0    6.9  -1.5  4.8 
Other crops  11.9  -4.1  -0.7    17.3  -4.7  -1.9 
Livestock  -0.2  5.6  3.4    -1.2  6.6  2.2 
Forestry  -0.1  10.5  14.6    -1.2  11.4  15.1 
Fishing  0.4  1.5  -1.1    0.1  1.9  -0.9 
Petroleum and coal 
products  10.8  -0.1  2.3    13.7  0.0  2.3 
Ruminant meat  6.4  -1.3  1.6    10.3  -1.8  1.4 
Non-ruminant meat  -1.9  -2.2  7.0    10.0  -2.6  6.3 
Other processed 
agriculture  3.7  -0.1  1.8    4.1  -0.2  1.2 
Beverages & tobacco  14.5  -12.5  -3.1    57.5  -26.6  -4.8 
Textiles & apparel  2.0  3.0  10.6    1.9  2.9  11.8 
Chemicals  3.0  5.3  7.6    2.9  9.9  24.2 
Metal manufactures  2.9  1.5  3.3    3.0  1.2  6.0 
Wood & paper 
products  1.2  1.5  0.1    1.5  1.7  1.2 
Manufacturing  1.1  5.6  5.4    3.6  4.0  9.3 
Transport & 
communications  -0.1  -0.5  6.5    -0.4  -0.4  6.8 
Business services  -0.6  -0.9  -1.3    -1.4  -0.7  -0.3 
Services and activities 
NES  -0.2  -0.7  -0.9    -0.7  -0.5  0.6 
Total  1.5  2.4  5.5     2.7  2.5  7.4 
Source. GTAP simulation. 
 
On the import side there are no significant increases in Indonesian imports, with the exception 
of vegetables and fruit and textiles and apparel. If Indonesia is not required to reduce support 
for  rice  and  sugar,  and  few  jobs  are  at  risk,  there  is  a  question  as  to  why  Indonesia  is  
expressing concern with the negotiated arrangements under ACFTA, ignoring for the time 
being that there has been no change in the political economy towards greater opposition to 
trade liberalisation. The modelling shows more significant increases for Vietnam, particularly 
rice, oilseeds, non-ruminant meats and textiles. Since Vietnam is a rice exporter, the high 
percentage change in imports is off a very low base. Comparing the two scenarios shows 
where the protection is maintained by the exemptions – other crops, beverages and tobacco, 
and manufactures (which includes motor vehicles). 
 
Table 9 Change in imports  
  FTA as negotiated    FTA without exemptions 









  %  %  %    %  %  % 
Paddy rice & proc rice  2.7  5.7  750.2    71.7  3.0  845.0 
Other cereals  1.7  1.5  1.8    2.9  1.7  1.3 
Oilseeds  0.8  2.1  16.8    1.2  2.3  20.1 
Vegetable oils and fats  2.4  1.8  1.3    3.1  2.0  1.7 
Sugar  1.6  1.1  1.5    2.9  1.8  1.0 
Vegetables and fruit  9.2  6.1  10.1    10.2  6.1  10.8 
Other crops  2.5  1.1  4.7    3.4  1.0  8.9 
Livestock  2.2  2.3  2.2    3.5  2.6  3.6 
Forestry  1.7  3.6  2.0    2.9  3.8  3.1 
Fishing  2.0  2.2  7.5    3.0  2.3  7.5 
Petroleum and coal 
products  2.6  1.8  7.8    3.7  1.8  8.8 
Ruminant meat  1.2  2.8  3.2    2.0  3.2  3.5 
Non-ruminant meat  2.9  3.8  9.7    4.9  3.8  10.9 
Other processed 
agriculture  3.8  3.4  4.1    4.7  3.4  4.2 
Beverages & tobacco  1.1  0.0  1.5    1.8  -1.3  11.5 
Textiles & apparel  2.9  9.0  13.3    3.6  9.3  14.4 
Chemicals  2.2  3.1  3.7    4.4  3.5  5.4 
Metal manufactures  1.7  3.8  3.7    3.0  3.4  4.8 
Wood & paper 
products  2.2  2.1  4.2    3.3  2.3  5.1 
Manufacturing  1.6  2.5  4.1    2.8  2.6  7.7 
Transport & 
communications  0.7  1.3  -1.6    1.5  1.3  -1.0 
Business services  0.8  1.4  2.6    1.6  1.4  2.7 
Services and activities 
NES  0.7  2.3  3.3    1.5  2.3  3.4 
Total  1.8  2.7  5.8     3.1  2.8  7.7 
Source. GTAP simulation.  
 
5. Conclusions, limitations and implications 
In  comparing  the  response  of  Indonesia  and  Vietnam‘s  to  an  FTA  with  China,  it  seems 
Vietnam has obtained a greater protective effect with its exemptions than Indonesia. Without 
exemptions,  Vietnam‘s  imports  would  rise  from  5.8  to  7.7  per  cent  whereas  Indonesia‘s 
would increase marginally from 2.7 to 2.8. Less developed and more diversified Vietnam has 
150 products in its sensitive list whereas Indonesia has only 47, but China with its broader 
and larger economy has 101. A more important reason why Vietnam may have obtained a 
greater degree of protection than Indonesia is that Indonesia has higher tariffs to start with. 
But this conclusion changes once NTBs are taken into account and the size of the costs of 
assistance  once  productivity  differential  are  also  taken  into  account.  Indonesia‘s  average 
applied agricultural tariff is 8 per cent compared with Vietnam‘s 19 per cent. On trade with 
China, Indonesia has high tariffs on rice and sugar, but low tariffs on most other goods. By 
contrast, Vietnam has much higher tariffs across a range of imports from China. NTBS have a 
significant effect on aspects such as allocative efficiency at the sectoral level at which they 
are applied. Benefits of productivity growth dominate those from allocative efficiency which 
it enhances along with additional endowments.  
 
In the Introduction, the question was asked of why is Vietnam more accepting of the ACFTA 
than Indonesia. It was proffered that this could be a result of Vietnam‘s location next to China 
and the threat of informal trade without any trade agreements plus its recent experience of the 
benefits  of  trade  liberalisation,  for  example  in  the  form  of  cheap  imports.  Evidence  of 
Vietnam‘s greater acceptance of ACFTA was obtained from an industry survey in a recent 
Vanzetti, Trewin and Cassing (2010) study of Vietnam FTAs where threatened industries 
such as pulp and paper remained optimistic that they could develop a niche off cheap Chinese 
inputs. Indonesia is not a neighbour of China and the benefits of trade liberalisation are not as 
recently evident. And as just outlined, it has committed to bigger tariff cuts under ACFTA 
than Vietnam which would concern some protected industries even though the Indonesian 
economy will be the biggest beneficiary of these cuts. There has also been a large change in 
the Indonesian  political economy with a move to a decentralised political system that has 
given  greater  power  to  minority  interests  including  those  that  see  a  threat  in  opening  up 
Indonesian  agriculture to greater international competition. Perhaps because of its lack  of 
tariff  protection  (as  distinct  from  less  transparent  protection  from  NTBs),  Indonesia  is 
currently attempting to renegotiate its highly sensitive list with China. However, if items are 
to be included in the list, others must be removed. This creates an inevitable trade-off among 
Indonesian domestic producers, and China must be persuaded to agree. To date, getting this 
agreement has proved difficult.  
 
As with all modelling, the analysis has limitations. Producers and consumers may not respond 
to  tariff  changes  as  readily  as  the  modelling  suggests.  Furthermore,  the  tariff  changes 
modelled here may not occur causing the estimates to be ‗outer envelope‘ ones (PC 2010). 
Already we have seen further negotiations to slow down the reform process which can also 
occur through the greater use of NTBs outside the ACFTA. 
 
There  are two important groups of implications from the above  analysis, both  for GTAP 
modelling  and  for  Australian  and  other  countries  negotiations  with  countries  like  China, 
Indonesia and Vietnam. The GTAP modelling implications include that if only tariff trade 
constraints are available in the data base for analysis then the results of the modelling can be 
misleading in terms of the benefits of trade liberalisation. Other trade constraints such  as 
NTBs need to be incorporated, especially in situations like in Indonesia where these dominate 
the trade constraints, if their costs or the benefits of trade liberalisation are to realistically 
estimated. Even where just modelling of reduction of tariffs is appropriate, care need to taken 
to avoid the ―outer envelope‖ criticisms of CGE modelling of FTAs, for example assuming 
liberalisation is fully implemented when this is most likely not to be the case (PC 2010). 
 
There are also important implications for trade negotiations from the analysis. The negotiated 
agreements need to be comprehensive, not only in terms of covering agriculture and other 
goods, services etc that enable trade offs in the political economy, such as in agricultural 
liberalisation in the longer term with better services access  under TAFTA (Bosworth and 
Trewin 2006), but in terms of trade constraints. Tariffs are not the whole trade liberalisation 
story and as they diminish in importance, NTBs have tended to grow in importance. However, 
NTBs have proved difficult to address in FTAs as like with many service trade constraints 
they  are  entwined  with  domestic  policies.  What  needs  to  be  done  is  to  show  that  such 
measures are not in the best interests of the country imposing them. Indonesia has liberalised 
tariffs but has not opened its agriculture to international competition and realised the benefits 
of  reallocating  resources  to  better  uses  and  developing  fully  its  domestic  agriculture  to 
compete  internationally.  There  are  better  ways  for  Indonesia  to  achieve  its  legitimate 
objectives  in  agriculture  and  it  needs  to  be  encouraged  to  unilaterally  reform  in  its  own 
interest, not on the basis of any trade agreement. Trade facilitation is important in this so if 
trade agreements offer help in this regard, such as with R&D that increases productivity, this 
should be encouraged. At least this would lower the costs of closed policies if they were 
maintained but at the same time encouraging more openness to take advantage of growing 
trade opportunities. Such approaches can address the important political economy constraints. 
Why are Indonesian tariff cuts under ACFTA of concern when in reality they would have  
little impact because of the prevalence of NTBs? Do stakeholders putting pressure on not 
liberalising not appreciate this, or as is often the case in trade reform, do a few that are under 
threat  of  being  disadvantaged  complain  more  loudly  than  a  silent,  often  hard  to organise 
majority of consumers, who would gain? Or is it just a reflection of Indonesian misplaced 
scepticism of the benefits of trade liberalisation which they have enjoyed but are not fully 
aware of unlike Vietnam where the benefits are more recently obvious? Fane and Warr (2007) 
put  forward  a  credible  answer  to  the  question  of  why  there  are  different  Indonesian  and 
Vietnamese responses to the ACFTA, which is a changing political economy towards populist 
economic nationalism that is anti-trade followed the decentralisation of Indonesia‘s political 
system.  
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